





WHY OBAMA IS BLACK: 







[W]ords are our tools, and, as a minimum we should use clean tools: we should 
know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves against 
the traps that language sets us.1 
 
 
When he filled out the race section of the 2010 U.S. Census 
survey, President Barack Obama checked the “Black, African Am., 
or Negro” box despite the fact that Obama is of both European-
American and African ancestry.2  This simple fact raises a number of 
complicated questions and challenges the idea that race, or more 
properly, racism, is a thing of the past or “post” as used in “post-
racial.”  “Post-racial” is rhetoric for an ideology that promotes “a 
larger national and legal consensus that ignores the bulk of racial 
disparities, inequities, and imbalances in society, and pursues race-
neutral remedies as a fundamental, a priori value.”3  Ironically, the 
ideology garners support from Obama’s presidential election in 
2008, which launched widespread reports that the country elected its 
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first “black” president.4  For many, the election provided concrete 
proof of improved race relations.  Such believers epitomized 
Obama’s election as fulfilling the American promise; for others, 
however, he symbolized a formidable challenge to the “post-racial” 
posture.  Hence, although the term “post” intends to point to the 
past, it is really about the future, a destination that has yet to be 
achieved.  It is a way of wishing away the present and supplanting it 
with an idealized future.  Under such pretentions, “post-racial” 
reflects a desire to identify with something more sublime than the 
status quo. 
 Framing Obama as a poster for “post-racial” suffers from 
various defects.  The most fundamental is the assumption that he is 
“black” in the first place.  Although the decision that the president 
indeed is “black” is practically unanimous, such a conclusion 
neglects his “white” heritage.  President Obama could have checked 
black and white on the census survey, but he passed on the option.5  
This decision raises unsettling questions for post-racial ideologues.  
Rather than signal arrival into the post-racial age, however, his 
choice on the survey could be read as a denial of whiteness or an 
unfair response given the survey’s purposes, which imply an 
obligation to represent oneself based on parental lineage as opposed 
to racial ideology.  But what if Obama’s logic led him to identify as 
“white”?  For many this proposition would not ring true.  Yet 
Obama’s self-identification as “black” raises no protest.  Why the 
double standard?  Of course the question itself is rhetorical—
because a rigorous baseline logic is already at play. 
 Although Obama’s story is not the only forceful challenge 
to the “post racial” concept, it affords a solid frame to consider the 
merits and myths.  A sober read of Tea Party rhetoric and the Henry 
Louis Gates episode indicate that talk of “post-racial” is premature, 
a point further exclaimed by the resignation of Shirley Sherrod.6  Far 
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from relegating racism to the back burner, events since Obama’s 
election have stoked racial flames and revealed that race still matters.  
His presidential victory might have ignited widespread faith in a 
“post-racial” era, but a more pessimistic read would render it a 
backlash from the country’s collective guilt over the Bush regime 
that moved voters to “reject the party of an unpopular president.”7  
The election may have helped herald in an era of wishful thinking 
called “post-racial,” yet its logic, paradoxically enough, was governed 
by the rule of hypodescent, which can drown an oceanic man in the 
tide of one drop.   
 What follows is a critique of the “post-racial” ideology.  It 
begins with “Language and Law,” which provides a theoretical 
backdrop to map how law influences common language, and more 
importantly, how concepts rooted in racism maintain in the 
American lexicon through the force of law.  The next section, 
“White by Law,” analyzes the legal and social constructions of 
whiteness, a historical survey that arrives at constructions in the 
American context.  Building from the previous parts, “Structures of 
Racism,” outlines how racial language and ideals of white superiority 
work in tandem to produce structural racism, that is, racism beyond 
individual bigotry.  Today’s racism is not simply the aggregate of 
individual interactions; rather, the discrimination resides in the 
institutions and polity of American society, particularly in the 
language of law.  The last section, “Beyond Binaries and Reinscribed 
Racism,” is a normative venture that offers ideas for stemming the 
force of these linguistic and conceptual burdens.  Centuries of racial 
sedimentation have made some aspects of racism invisible to the 
eye, yet an analysis of the post-racial concept shows that debates on 
race and color are fundamentally flawed.  This Essay exposes the 
concept as a type of wishful thinking, and more critically, how the 
law prevents this wish from being fulfilled. 
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I. LANGUAGE AND LAW 
 
The law enshrines racial vocabulary in constitutions, court 
opinions, statutes and particularly, U.S. Census survey 
questionnaires.  This set of laws and legal documents have a 
profound influence on the way Americans conceive and speak of 
one another.  At minimum, they may be seen as providing society 
with a legal base of racial vocabulary.  This is not to say that the law 
is not influenced by social forces in the construction of race, but it is 
a limited factor so long as the law continues to recognize race as 
reality.  The quibble is not merely about what someone wants to be 
called, but about how the law structures routine practices of life by 
“eliciting compliance or generating acts of resistance . . . [by 
providing] the framework for legitimate discourse and action.”8  The 
law discursively enshrines words and concepts, and imports them 
into other political arenas, including politically correct speech.  
Although texts like federal and state constitutions are not the 
originators of the terminology supporting structural distinction, the 
governing documents legitimatize these terms and help lay 
cornerstones for the lexical foundation.  
 Since the penning of the U.S. Constitution, the term 
“Indian” has been used to describe generically a vast group of 
cultural and linguistic groups.9  This misnomer is attributed to the 
hagiography of Christopher Columbus.  It is a piece of Americana 
that encapsulates the story of Columbus’ arrival to the “New 
World” in 1492.  He arrived on what would become American 
shores, yet he thought he had arrived in India, and hence called the 
people he encountered “Indians.”10  Although perhaps more myth 
than history, even if one accepts Columbus as the blunderer behind 
the mislabeling of these people, it is interesting that the misnomer 
persists, through the repetitive telling of how these people became 
“Indians” in the first wrongful place, and further through the 
Constitution, which fossilized the term.   
 As it has in other imperialistic contexts, labeling “Indian” in 
colonial America helped in the construction of a savage, lawless, 
unordered individual, which was a prerequisite for intervention.11  
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Like the Greek’s use of “barbarian” to denigrate all non-Greeks, the 
construction of the “savage” against the civility of Christianity was 
made possible by the power inherent in naming.12  Later, more 
politically correct attempts to transform the “Indian” into 
“American Indian” were laced with equally troublesome 
connotations since “America” derived from the European sailor, 
Amerigo Vespucci.  The label “American Indians” thus represented 
a hegemonic tag-team, the mistaken “Indian,” compounded by 
reference to an Italian merchant.   
To depict the Indian’s political organization, the 
Constitution uses the term “tribes,”13 a word with derogatory 
denotations that “served to differentiate the minorities and deviants 
and those only partially colonized from the mainstream or the 
colonial powers.”14  For the Supreme Court, “tribe” linked to a 
foreign lifestyle, one that had to be left behind in order to be 
granted the rights of a full-fledged foreigner.15  Certainly, when 
referring to groups in the African context, Europeans and colonial 
Americans already had a long history of using “tribes” under such 
negative stereotypes.16   
The term “race” made its constitutional debut with the 
Fifteenth Amendment in 1870.17  This Amendment also uses the 
term “color,”18 which had already appeared in the 1850 Census.19  
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Three decades after the enactment of the Amendment, the Census 
reinforced the Constitution’s use of “race” in its introduction to the 
1900 Census survey.20  Thus, between the U.S. Census and 
Constitution, race and color became legitimate categories for 
American organization, whose linguistic force was practically 
inscrutable. 
Like constitutions, black letter law represents a means 
through which racial language inscribes in federal and state polity.  
At various legislative levels, biased conceptions of race are 
entrenched in statutory language: 
“[W]hite” did attain wide usage in New World political 
discourse, and it was written into an immense body of 
statutory law.  In the colonies the designation “white” 
appeared in laws governing who could marry whom; 
who could participate in the militia, who could vote or 
hold office; and in laws governing contracts, indenture, 
and enslavement.21 
Congressional edicts such as the Naturalization Act of 1790 asserted 
that “any alien, being a free white person . . . may be admitted to 
become a citizen,” essentially codifying whiteness as a prerequisite 
for citizenship for immigrants.22  Prior to this legislation was the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787,23 which, the Supreme Court would 
later hold, forbade nonwhites from becoming citizens of the new 
territory.  This law of exclusivity played out fiercely in the infamous 
Dred Scott case nearly sixty years later.24  Here, the Court held that 
no person descending from Africa, whether slave or free could 
become a citizen of the United States—a rationale that relied heavily 
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on the Declaration of Independence.25  At the state level, legislators 
used race and color to create the notorious anit-miscegenation 
statutes.  Some of these efforts aimed to patrol racial borders 
directly and comprehensively like Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act of 
1924,26 but most anti-miscegenation legislation aimed to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over bodies and sexual relations.  In the 
statutes, “race” and “color” play a most pernicious role in social 
relations and offer a candid look at how law and language 
intersected to the detriment of those designated non-white.  
Perhaps more than any form of institutional discourse, the 
U.S. Census survey has set the course for contributing to politically 
correct racial language.  For over two centuries, the survey forms 
have been the most grassroots broadcast of racial taxonomy.  The 
Census is mandated by Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution 
that explains “[e]numeration” for tax purposes.27  As such, the 
Census was initially used as a means to determine tax liability that 
necessitated an accurate count of slaves.  From the first survey in 
1790, this attempt to document American demographics has 
occurred at ten year intervals, making the 2010 Census the twenty-
third.28  This ten-year ritual is a national broadcast of official race 
classifications, which make their way into a preponderance of state 
jurisdictions, their laws, and jurisprudence.  Since the earliest days 
the census survey divided “white” from other racial classifications—
and this is quite the same today, a feat made substantively possible 
by census instructions to enumerators that “a person of mixed 
blood, Negro and White, should be returned as Negro, no matter of 
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how small the percentage of Negro blood.”29  Meanwhile, in cases 
of Negro and Indian miscegenation, the rules were much different 
since a person of both Indian and African blood could be counted 
as Indian if Indian blood predominated and the person was accepted 
as Indian in the community.30   
 
II. WHITE BY LAW 
 
“White” is a historically contingent category, and in the 
American colonial period, the granting of “white” status to ethnic 
groups was more selective than it is today.  The New World 
reconfiguration of whiteness showed how concepts of race and 
color could be reworked to virtually any end; even the Irish, who 
started off as “white niggers” in America,31 could be bleached under 
such a racial project, where the “interpretation, representation or 
explanation of racial dynamics” is “an effort to reorganize and 
redistribute resources along particular racial lines.”32   
In American courts, litigation around the issue of 
determining “whiteness” has been contentious, and whiteness, as 
defined by the courts, has been a “slippery substance.”33  In some 
instances, the difficulty was not the indeterminacy of whiteness as 
much as the judiciary’s role, since “most judges were eager to 
explain how a certain petitioner might be readily distinguishable 
from ‘white persons.’ ”34  The consequence of this racial 
reorientation, aside from betraying tendencies of European history, 
meant that the path to becoming “American” was open to other 
Europeans.  Here, it is relevant to speculate whether the 
hyphenation phenomenon in American culture is relevant.  For 
example, phrases like Arab-American, Asian-American, and African-
American are common, yet one hardly hears of an English-
American, German-American, or French-American; the trends 
perhaps indicate that not to be hyphenated, to be just “American” is 
a toll paid by whiteness.  As naming goes, the law has prescribed 
that whites are always American, the axis mundi, while non-whites 
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are always some derivative form of American, but never quite the 
real thing. 
Although some groups which historically have been the 
colored other are now part of the colorless white race, the force of 
law continues to maintain racial divisions.  Since being deemed 
“white” by law and society directly ties to benefits and privileges, 
this reality supports critical race arguments that “whiteness” is a 
form of property.35  Attempts at acquiring and exploiting whiteness 
were certainly the trend in the post Civil War era, where the lighter-
skinned mulatto elite modeled life after affluent whites and 
“distanced themselves from the larger African-American community 
by excluding darker blacks from their social organizations.”36  By 
these practices and others like “conking” hair to straighten it and 
selecting lighter skinned mates to “whiten up,” whiteness proves 
itself a commodity that leads to a sphere of social benefit.  It is the 
light-skinned “black” who gets a better job and treatment because 
“white” people think she is one of their own, a stroke of fate that is 
viewed among the highest of compliments back in her darker 
community, where she garners further privilege—all of which builds 
on a baseline of white superiority. 
 
III. STRUCTURES OF RACISM 
 
The law influences social discourse by institutionalizing 
inherently discriminatory words and concepts, thereby embedding 
racism in spaces outside of individual consciousness.  The aggregate 
of such bias may be described as “structural racism,” where the 
notion of “structural” expands the analysis beyond the individual, 
interpersonal prejudice of day-to-day existence to include “the 
totality of the social relations and practices that reinforce white 
privilege.”37  This perspective insists that racism persists not merely 
in the “[sum total] of . . . individual acts in which white people 
discriminate, harass, stereotype, or otherwise mistreat people of 
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color,”38 but rather the “accumulated effects of centuries of white 
racism have given it an institutional nature that is more entrenched 
than racial prejudice.”39  This approach “treats racism as institutional 
and explores how groups successfully defining themselves as ‘white’ 
have been able to marshal political, economic, and social power for 
themselves at the expense of those they define as ‘nonwhite.’ ”40  
Like the skeletal frame of a building hidden by the façade of 
sheetrock and paint, structural racism is hidden behind concepts like 
“color” and “race” and their infirmities, the lead and asbestos of 
language.  Indeed such manifestations are more difficult to combat 
since the discrimination is systemic and endemic, and thus, often 
“immune to antidiscrimination remedies.”41  The idea accounts for 
ideological gaps between whites and nonwhites, namely, that for 
whites, racism is a question of individual prejudice, whereas for 
nonwhites, the issue is systemic or institutional.42 
This point plays out semantically in common speech, where, 
in the English language, black and white embody additional meaning 
beyond a direct correspondence to color.  “Black” has been 
connected to the most sinister, threatening concepts, extreme 
hazard and negativity, while “white” attaches to cleanliness, 
innocence, and purity.43  In contrast to the positive associations of 
whiteness, dark things are often categorized as “dangerous, 
threatening, manipulative, dishonest, or immoral,”44 and therefore as 
things that must be sequestered, perhaps symbolized by chattel 
slavery or post-Civil Rights trends in incarceration. 
Racism and white supremacy have a long history in the 
United States, the thrust of which begins with the arrival of the 
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Puritans and their religious vision.45  Their definitive ideas about 
“enlightenment” and “darkness” were contemporaneous with slave-
master invocations of the Curse of Ham used to justify slavery.  In 
this narrative, Noah curses his own grandson and makes him a slave 
to his brothers.46  In due time, however, the curse came to be 
interpreted as a “burn”—that his offspring had black skin, the mark 
that evidenced their punishment of subservience.47  Structural 
analysis thus also reveals the role of religious thought in shaping 
racial ideas in law and within institutions.  
 
IV. BEYOND BINARIES AND REINSCRIBED RACISM 
 
The issue that inspired this Essay, President Barack 
Obama’s lost whiteness, has seemingly been swallowed by the rules 
of race in the United States, most notably, of hypodescent.  
Obama’s decision to select only “black” is merely incidental to the 
public’s perception, for his physical appearance made him “black” 
long before he chose it on the Census.  Making Obama “black” 
further provided proof that the country had progressed in race-
consciousness by electing a black person, notwithstanding the 
relentless reinforcement of one-drop ideology that supported the 
evidence.  Everyone’s acceptance of Obama as a black man and not 
a white man is revealing.  This fact critiques “post-racial” as 
imaginary, for regardless of how Obama might have responded on 
the Census, even if he checked both black and white, even Native 
Hawaiian, the public’s mind was made up—he was “black.”  So, 
although there has been pitched debate about Obama’s birth and 
citizenship, there is little to no debate on why the president is black; 
even prior to his presidential election, Obama had been called many 
things, racial epithets included, but “white” has not been one of 
them. 
 Obama’s story offers a prime example of how the law 
institutionalizes racial language such that elitist concepts which 
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JUSTIFICATION OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 196 (2002). 
  




informed the earliest taxonomies extend to the present.  Today, 
nonwhites are still enslaved by words, bound by names and labels 
born of race and color.  The ultimate expression of the hegemony is 
when subjective language itself is internalized by minorities, and 
allegiance to the socio-legal construct becomes the primary marker 
of identity.  Sometimes the allegiance leads people to defend the 
notion of being “black” or a “woman of color,” that “black is 
beautiful,” appropriations which, in addition to whatever else they 
do, superordinate whiteness.  They are expressions of captivated 
minds bound by colonial dialect.  Thus, even though scholars and 
scientists have long argued against the category of “race” and have 
described the term as a “social construct,”48 the more accurate 
portrayal is a construct of power.  It is a tool to construct taxonomies 
and legal classifications in order to stratify and segregate, rendering 
Obama’s “historic” election only a half-truth.  Many have been too 
busy feasting on this political crumb to see the reinforcement of 
centuries-old racism.  Rather than waste more time in self-
congratulation and celebration, progressive thinkers might seize this 
opportune moment to separate the merit from the myth, clear the 
mind from post-racial swirl, and see where other bias resides. 
Foremost is the rhetoric of “color” and how it undermines 
post-racial potential.  Although some theoreticians find it 
fashionable to talk about people “of color” or to identify as a person 
“of color,” the thinking is less than libratory.  Rather, designations 
like “white” and “colored” are modern incarnations of public signs 
which characterized segregationist spaces in pre-civil rights America.  
This was the language of the racist establishment that coded color 
with slavery and freedom with whiteness.  The repetition of this 
racist vision rears its head every time some individual or group 
claims to be “of color,” not to mention that groups like the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
were conceived on this hierarchical division.  The misnomer roots in 
its inaccuracy as a descriptive since it reiterates “white” as beyond 
the pale of “color,” a mutual exclusion.  It is modern doublespeak 
for society to talk of white as a color for paint, paper, or any 
objective other, yet to exclude white as a color when it comes to 
humans, as in the 1850 Census instruction number six, which directs 
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perspective . . . . In particular, critical race scholars have argued that law (in its 
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that for one who is “White,” the color box should be left blank.49  
Such schemes and word-wielding might be expected of nineteenth 
and twentieth century American racists who spoke this way to 
separate drinking fountains, restrooms, and restaurants, but for legal 
theory in the twenty first century, they are unacceptable.  Use of the 
term “of color” reiterates white exclusivity, artificially divides, and 
hinders potential for alliance and bridge-building, helping to push 
“post-racial” deeper into the realm of rhetoric. 
Of course, the question of how to combat this legacy or 
what any redistribution of power might look like is only relevant 
inasmuch as there is recognition of this privilege and from whence it 
came.  Thus, despite whatever normative gains might ensue from 
this Essay, attempts at linguistic reform will only succeed inasmuch 
as there is relinquishment of the privileges which attach to 
whiteness, those “economic ‘extras’ that those . . . who are middle 
class and wealthy gain at the expense of poor and working-class 
people of all races.”50  Despite how this rigorous maintenance of 
purity and superiority flies in the face of world history, it detracts 
nothing from the absolute truth:  humans have always intermingled 
across color lines and have never been in isolation from one 
another, a point that concomitantly admits that there is no pure—not 
even a pure Indian.  For practical starters, then, reform might begin 
with a symbolic gesture like striking down the appearance of 
“Indian” and “tribes” in the U.S. Constitution.  This is one simple 
thing—but it is easy to think of more, most obviously, retiring the 
attempt to count by “race”—the Census should be relieved of this 
impossible task and collect a pension for showing just how 
conceptually unstable “race” has proved from one decade to the 
next.   
Among the towering influences on common parlance and 
politically correct speech, the U.S. Census rides high as a beacon of 
confusion that simultaneously reveals the illusory nature of “race” in 
its mash-up of conceptual apples and oranges.  On the latest 2010 
Census, what constitutes race categorizes by geography, as in 
“Asian,” by color, as in “black” or “white,” or even nationality, as in 
“Chinese” or “Korean.”51  The list goes on.  The absence of any 
division within the white category is conspicuous and suggests that 
all the light-skinned people of the world are invited into the “white” 
club of America, where color status alone can help pave a path to 
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success and wealth.52  For newcomers, abandoning “unique 
histories, primary languages, accents, distinctive dress, family names, 
and cultural expressions” is a small price to pay for acceptance into 
the circle.53  For everyone else, there are qualifications to having 
American status.  A dark-skinned, Spanish-speaking American, 
despite being a citizen and taxpayer, will always be called something 
else.  It will be “Latin-American” or “Mexican-American,” or some 
other elongated hyphenation that falls short of “American.”  The 
otherness of dark complexion, slanted eyes, and different gods is 
kept alive by the law’s use of a range of words, from “black,” to 
“Jap,” to “Hindu,” categories of the Census that reveal a method of 
data collection that is really no method at all. 
As a means to break the dominance of contemporary 
linguistic patterns, recognition of rhetoric’s role in the law is the first 
step.  The primary lesson is how language is used persuasively and 
even coercively; it is recognition “not merely that whiteness is 
oppressive and false; it is that whiteness is nothing but oppressive 
and false.”54  The stakes beyond include awakening to the 
taxonomies that artificially divide people and the limitations of the 
master’s tools.  No matter how beautiful black is, it implies a victory 
for “white.”  Today’s names and concepts are the linguistic 
remnants of a master who used them to separate freemen from slave 
in the project of social stratification.  The awesome power exercised 
in naming has staggered minority groups since before the drafting of 
the first U.S. Census, which was contemporaneous with the drafting 
of the Constitution itself.  These realities render suspect the “data” 
generated by the Census, which falters under methodological 
scrutiny, undermining any claim to the production of reliable 
information.  Rather, the collection and crunching is skewed by the 
one-drop rule and other biases which presume a white baseline.  
Only when “race” and “color” are eradicated from thought and 
speech can we start to move toward a post-racial world—the law 
and Census are no exception.  
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54  DAVID R. ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS:  
ESSAYS ON RACE, POLITICS, AND WORKING CLASS HISTORY 13 (1994). 
